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Many different kinds of entities use the United States patent 
system, from individual inventors, to start-ups, to patent assertion entities, 
to massive operating companies. Meanwhile, “reward theory,” “prospect 
theory,” and “commercialization theory” are three theories intended to 
explain the justifications for, or social costs and benefits of, a patent 
system.  Yet each theory barely acknowledges what goes on during actual 
patent acquisition, licensing or enforcement, such as transaction costs and 
litigation uncertainties. This article considers prior economic analyses of 
the patent system in this new light – patent economic theories, compared 
against the types of patent-using entities, compared against the costs and 
uncertainties of patent acquisition, licensing and enforcement. 
  
 
                                                     
1
  Robert P. Greenspoon is a trial and appellate attorney who cofounded Flachsbart & 
Greenspoon, LLC, a full service boutique intellectual property law firm.  Catherine M. Cottle 
holds a Bachelor of Arts degree in economics from the University of Chicago.  She is now a law 
student at Chicago Kent College of Law.  Many versions of the old joke that inspired the title of 
this article are on the Internet.  This one comes from Andrew Biggs, Notes on Social Security 
Reform, http://andrewgbiggs.blogspot.com/2009/06/assume-can-opener.html (last visited Nov. 
18, 2010): 
A physicist, a chemist and an economist are stranded on an island, with nothing to eat.  A can of 
soup washes ashore.  The physicist says, “Let's smash the can open with a rock.”  The chemist 
says, “Let's build a fire and heat the can first.”  The economist says, “Let's assume that we have a 
can-opener . . .” 




I.  INTRODUCTION 
Five general types of entities license and enforce patents: 
 
 Individual inventors with a single patent (the “One Big Idea Inventors”); 
 Individual serial inventors (the “Thomas Edisons”); 
 Non-Practicing Entities (the “NPEs”); 
 Operating companies who practice inventions acquired from others (the “Not-
Invented-Heres”); and 
 Operating companies who practice inventions developed in-house (the “R&D 
Practitioners”). 
 
Each of these can be further subdivided into subtypes.  For example, individual 
inventors (the first two types) either do or do not use their own inventions.  NPEs come in 
many varieties, and include businesses whose model involves solely licensing and 
enforcement, as well as universities and government agencies.  R&D operating 
companies come in all different sizes – say, small and large.  So a more precise overview 
of patent enforcers might list the following: 
 
One Big Idea Inventors 
   Practices the Invention 
Does Not Practice the Invention 
  
“Thomas Edison” 
   Practices the Invention 










   Smaller 
Larger 
  
Certainly there are overlaps and evolutions.  A single entity might arguably fit 
into multiple categories.  For example, a larger operating company might be a non-
practicing entity for a specific patent it seeks to enforce.  But its operating company 
status will generally dominate its attitudes and approaches toward enforcement (e.g., fear 
of countersuits).  One type of entity might grow into another.  “Thomas Edisons” might 
form operating companies around their inventions (as Mr. Edison himself did).  In the 
other direction, former operating companies might become NPEs (Encyclopedia 




Britannica is one example).  But aspirations or evolutions aside, the entity‟s current type 
will dominate its thinking and planning. 
Patent licensing and enforcement operates differently for each type, and even for 
each subtype.  An individual inventor might have strikingly different goals than would an 
R&D entity (e.g., personal wealth creation, rather than product line protection).  Such an 
individual would likewise face different obstacles (e.g., lack of financial resources for 
enforcement, versus a risk of infringement countersuits).  The same difference in 
perspective exists among any pair of subtypes.  As one example, a small operating R&D 
company might see both the advantages and the disadvantages of patent enforcement 
quite differently from a large one. 
The law and economics literature about patents seems to ignore this rich diversity.  
This body of scholarship analyzes the interplay between positive law and economic 
forces motivating market players.  Law and economics supplies a powerful and widely 
accepted framework for evaluating policy or suggesting policy changes.  Yet it pays scant 
attention to the differing aims and means employed by different types of actors.  The 
omission might undermine the legitimacy of law and economics as applied to the patent 
system. 
This article begins to correct the omission.  It discusses how patent system 
economics will vary depending on the type of patent enforcer involved.  It tests various 
theories and methods against real world facts about patent licensing and enforcement. 
To begin, this article discusses several predominant patent system theories.  They 
are the “reward theory,” the “prospect theory,” and the “commercialization theory.”  
These theories explain in different ways the justifications for, or social costs and benefits 
of, a patent system.  Yet each of them barely acknowledges what goes on during actual 
patent licensing or enforcement.  Next, this article surveys some prior economic analyses 
of the patent system.  It exposes the conventional assumptions going into such analyses, 
and demonstrates that while they can offer provocative insights and generalizations, they 
often do not take into account real world factors.  Finally, this article concludes with the 
ramifications of injecting the aims of real patent actors into contemporary patent 
economic theory, exposing the need for modifications to the prevailing modes of thinking 
on the patent system. 
II.  PATENT ECONOMIC THEORIES 
Over time, three main patent system theories have emerged.  These are the reward 
theory, the prospect theory,
2
 and the commercialization theory.
3
  Each theory offers a 
perspective on motives and incentives behind the patenting decision, and a perspective on 
the effects of patent practices (such as licensing and enforcement).  As will be seen, 
certain aspects of them overlap.  Yet each provides a distinct point of view on what 
policy adjustments promote social welfare. 
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  Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & Econ. 265, 
266 (1977). 
3
  F. Scott Kieff, On the Economics of Patent Law and Policy, in Patent Law and Theory: A 
Handbook of Contemporary Research 3, 34-42 (Toshiko Takenaka ed., 2008). 




Underpinning each theory is a basic economic assumption – the primacy of 
rational choice.  Economists posit that systems behave as if each actor in the system seeks 
to maximize his or her own private welfare.  The words “as if” are significant.  
Economists are generally agnostic about whether specific actors ever make specific 
choices based on a conscious welfare calculation.  Even so, the patent system theories 
discussed below each take as their starting point the premise that the individuals or 
entities who innovate and patent are wealth-seeking rational actors. 
A. Reward Theory 
The reward theory is perhaps the most traditional of the three.  Under this theory, 
innovation is a social good.  Therefore, systems should be set up to reward innovation.  
Patents perform this function.  They ostensibly provide an inventor with exclusive rights 
to an invention for a period of years.
4
 
The reward is one pole of what has been called the incentive-access dilemma.
5
  
Incentives exist to spur innovation.  But the incentive itself is the promise of reduced 
access to future prospective entrants.  Policy discussion under the reward theory tends to 
focus on conceiving optimal incentive structures, while reducing the social costs of 
access restriction. 
Regarding access restriction, reward theorists believe that monopoly rights, once 
granted, tend to diminish social welfare.
6
  They make the assumption that exclusive rights 
over a technology lead to exclusive rights over a product market.  Exercise of monopoly 
power (which exclusivity allows under these assumptions) leads to reduced output and 
increased prices of finished goods compared to a purely competitive market.  This breeds 
the problem economists call “rent dissipation.”  Rent dissipation describes the total 
disappearance of a portion of social welfare based on pricing structure and output 
constraints.  As a baseline, economic theory holds that competitive markets supply the 
maximum social welfare.  This is seen in prototypical supply and demand curves as the 
area of the trapezoid determined by the price A appearing at the intersection of the supply 
– demand curve: 
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 Total social welfare is the sum of consumer welfare and producer welfare.  In perfect 
competition, marginal revenue equals marginal cost, and none of the area marked 
“Producer Welfare” represents a profit. 
In contrast, a monopoly condition (in the absence of competition) moves the price 
along the curve to point B.  Now what was part of the “Consumer Welfare” area falls into 
the “Producer Welfare” area.  This differential is producer profit – in this case, monopoly 
rent.  With a monopoly, there is now a different trapezoid whose area reflects social 
welfare: 






Mathematically, the area of the second trapezoid is less than the area of the first.  Thus, in 
this model, monopoly rent (and accompanying producer profit) causes social welfare to 
disappear – rent dissipation.  Where did it go?  Really, nowhere.  The reduction did not 
go to consumers or to producers, but vanished from the sum of producer and consumer 
welfare, and appears as a region labeled “Deadweight Loss” in the graph.  Thus, overall 
social welfare diminished because a producer was able to charge monopoly rents. 
In reward theory, society endures the reduction in social welfare, because the 
monopoly rents have paid the innovator.  Society understands that such rewards are 
needed for innovations to exist at all.  Then once the patent term expires, a competitive 
marketplace can return without any further payments to the innovator.  By the time of 
patent expiration, society deems the innovator to have been fully rewarded for any 
contribution. 
Reward theory sets up a powerful narrative, filled with moral overtones.
7
  Like a 
contemporary Prometheus, inventors bring light where before there was darkness.  
Innovators and innovating firms create new and useful ideas.  Mousetraps catch mice 
better, electric lights chase away the darkness, and airplanes fulfill humankind‟s dream of 
flying like the birds.  
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But another narrative holds that rewards can be unjust, or misused.  Those who 
barely innovate still reap the same reward as those who pioneered a field.  Industries 
complain of barriers to entry set up by those who contributed little to nothing in a field.  
Firms who merely patented that which would have been created by ordinary technicians 
in the ordinary course build fences around essential technologies.  Commentators evoke 
the metaphor of the bridge troll – the old fairy tale of the monster who lives under a 
bridge of someone else‟s making, and who collects a fee from all who pass.  
Enlarging the perspective – where multiple trolls lie in wait under many bridges – 
commentators invoke a more sophisticated metaphor.  They decry the “problem of the 
anti-commons,” sometimes called the “patent thicket.”8  The anti-commons idea posits 
that enterprises will tend not to produce a good or a service if there are too many rights 
holders who must be paid (e.g., licensing royalties).  Particularly in information 
technology industries, a single product might include hundreds of slight innovations, each 
potentially owned by a different party.  If the producer had to seek out and pay all 
stakeholders, the producer would just as well not enter the marketplace.  Or so the 
argument goes.  Commentators use the anti-commons idea to criticize the patent system 




The metaphor itself grew out of the plight of shopkeepers in Eastern Europe after 
the fall of communism.  In any given town, numerous agencies were in control of the 
government permits needed to open a business, and ownership of retail space was ill-
defined and shared among various different agencies.  In this environment, any number 
of actors had competing and overlapping property claims and the power to exclude the 
shopkeeper from opening.
10
  Analogizing this to patents, anti-commons commentators 
believe the patent system has become too solicitous of rights holders.  Such 
commentators are particularly concerned about the health of the information technology 
industry when confronted by rights holders with royalty demands. 
The problem of the anti-commons is an ironic twist on the earlier metaphor 
usually invoked in support of property rights: the problem (sometimes called tragedy) of 
the commons.  The problem of the commons is often used to justify property rights (such 
as patents).  It seeks to explain how a common resource tends to be misused or 
inefficiently allocated.
11
  For example, self-interested fishermen or livestock owners will 
tend to overfish or overgraze a common area.  Overuse of the commons eventually 
reduces everyone‟s welfare.  This is an example of an economic and legal condition 
where actions that are rational and wealth enhancing in the short run are actually 
irrational and impoverishing over the long run.  As will be described later, property rights 
(i.e., a private actor‟s right to exclude others) are seen as the antidote to this condition. 
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Historically, anti-patent narratives such as the anti-commons gained greater 
popularity once a large number of entities who did not practice their own patented 
invention began enforcing their patents.  Such NPEs included operating companies whose 
core operations no longer involved the patented area, research universities who had 
amassed portfolios invented by innovative faculty, individual inventors who never found 
a way to start a company around their ideas, and patent licensing entities formed to 
purchase patents from others for the sole purpose of deriving licensing revenue.  NPEs 
did not resemble the heroes of the pro-patent narrative of the reward theory – individuals 
and operating companies who create and nurture a consumer market in their own 
invention. 
These are the powerful moral narratives under the reward theory.  A patentee is 
either a Promethean savior on the one hand, or a bridge troll likened to a bloated post-
socialist bureaucracy on the other.  Reward theory implies a constant need to maintain a 
policy balance between these extremes.  The role of government is to adjust the 
incentive-access rules to maximize welfare.  Exclusive rights need either strengthening or 
weakening, depending on the proponent and the direction of contemporary public 
sentiment.
12
  One or another of these narratives is in play any time courts or legislatures 
make important decisions affecting patent terms, exclusionary powers, or patentability or 
infringement standards.  Court decisions often cite the monopoly power of a patent, and 
its capacity to diminish social welfare.
13
 
                                                     
12
  Kieff, supra note 3, at 35 (“[U]nder this view, the reward and its recipient must be 
regulated carefully to mitigate monopoly effects and transaction costs.”). 
13
  See, e.g., Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1966) (citations omitted): 
 
At the outset it must be remembered that the federal patent power stems from a 
specific constitutional provision which authorizes the Congress “To promote the 
Progress of . . . useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to . . . Inventors the 
exclusive Right to their . . . Discoveries.”  The clause is both a grant of power 
and a limitation.  This qualified authority, unlike the power often exercised in the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries by the English Crown, is limited to the 
promotion of advances in the “useful arts.”  It was written against the backdrop 
of the practices -- eventually curtailed by the Statute of Monopolies -- of the 
Crown in granting monopolies to court favorites in goods or businesses which 
had long before been enjoyed by the public.  The Congress in the exercise of the 
patent power may not overreach the restraints imposed by the stated 
constitutional purpose.  Nor may it enlarge the patent monopoly without regard 
to the innovation, advancement or social benefit gained thereby.  Moreover, 
Congress may not authorize the issuance of patents whose effects are to remove 
existent knowledge from the public domain, or to restrict free access to materials 
already available.  Innovation, advancement, and things which add to the sum of 
useful knowledge are inherent requisites in a patent system which by 
constitutional command must “promote the Progress of . . . useful Arts.”  This is 
the standard expressed in the Constitution and it may not be ignored. And it is in 
this light that patent validity “requires reference to a standard written into the 
Constitution.”  




Reward theory does not incorporate any notion of how patents are actually used.
14
  
If a patent system exists to reward innovators, then it should be able to differentiate 
pioneering inventions from minute improvements, and grant the former stronger rights.  
But it does not.  If reward theory explained firm behavior, firms would only seek patents 
that had a reasonable chance of either protecting a product line from competition or 
generating royalty income.  But that is not true either, given statistics showing that only 
about 1% of patents are ever litigated;
15
 by implication, the vast majority of patents must 
claim innovations that no one is using.  The “access” side of the incentive-access 
paradigm is also problematic.  First, individual patents almost never claim exclusive 
rights over a product market.
16
  Even when a product contains a patented invention, 
substitutes for that aspect of the product will almost always exist.  Thus, concerns over 
rent dissipation are overblown.
17
  Second, the notion that patent fences hurt competition 
is not universally accepted.  The anticommons problem is arguably a phantom problem.  
Owners want their rights to be used, and as long as there is an open registration system 
(such as assignment records at the United States Patent and Trademark Office) where 
patent owners can be identified, market actors can be located for negotiation.
18
  In 
                                                                                                                                                              
See also id. at 10-11 (“[T]he underlying policy of the patent system [is] that „the things which are 
worth to the public the embarrassment of an exclusive patent,‟ . . . must outweigh the restrictive 
effect of the limited patent monopoly.”); Amgen, Inc. v. F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd., 581 F. Supp. 
2d 160, 173 (D. Mass. 2008) (citations omitted): 
 
Since the inception of the Republic, our patent system “has been about the 
difficult business „of drawing a line between the things which are worth to the 
public the embarrassment of an exclusive patent, and those which are not.‟” 
Codified at 35 U.S.C. §§ 102(a)-(b), the novelty requirement reflects Congress's 
determination that the public will not pay the dear price of a 17-year monopoly 
for information that is already available to the public. 
14
  Kieff, supra note 3, at 36 (calling reward incentives “very sloppy in their effect”). 
15
  Jean O. Landjouw & Mark Schankerman, Characteristics of Patent Litigation: A Window 
on Competition, 32 RAND J. Econ. 1, 131 (2001). 
16
  Kieff, supra note 3, at 38 n.124 (citing literature pointing out that reward theories “seem 
to view an intellectual property right as somehow having a one-to-one correlation with a good or 
service that is sold in a market”). 
17
  Id. at 60 (“In the real world, the benefits of this type of market power for capital 
formation and dynamic competition must be weighed against its theoretical cost in the form of 
static deadweight loss. . . . [T]he reward literature‟s concern over mitigating monopoly effects of 
patents can be seen as unduly exalting static efficiency over dynamic efficiency.”). 
18
  Id. at 34.  Kieff makes an empirical argument to reject the anti-commons argument that 
too many negotiations are needed when a commercial product contains many technologies 
patented by others: 
 
One could imagine that the number of patent permissions needed to get business 
done could lead to high prices and difficulties structuring the needed transactions.  








Nonetheless, reward theory still has its proponents.  In a later section, this article 
will test reward theory and its power to explain behavior of the different types and 
subtypes of licensing and enforcement entities. 
B. Prospect Theory 
Prospect theory seeks to explain the complex interactions among multiple 
innovators, usually those competing against one another.  Advocated by Edmund W. 
Kitch in his seminal 1977 article, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, prospect 
theory analogizes patent grants to nineteenth century mineral rights in the western United 
States.  The government wanted to encourage prospecting and mining activity to advance 
the nation‟s industrial infrastructure.  As a result, mineral rights presumptively went to 
the first discoverer of a potential deposit.  The discoverer made a “claim.”  The claim was 
a public announcement of the first discovery, and informed others of its location.  The 
claim served to communicate to other prospectors where not to go, because claims were 
validated in order of priority.  The claim also had some particular restrictions.  For 
example, the mineral claim system “restrict[ed] the area that can be claimed through rules 
that specify maximum boundaries in relation to the location of the mineralization,” and 
also “ha[d] rules designed to eliminate claims that prove unpromising and return them to 
the public domain.”20 
Prospect theorists point to the similarities between mining claims and patents.  
The patent document serves as a public announcement of an innovation that has already 
occurred.  The government grants the rights to the first innovator, so long as the 
requirements of patentability are observed.  With the open nature of the patent document, 
an innovating firm in effect tells other firms what has already been invented.  Thus they 
incentivize other firms, particularly competitors, to “prospect” in other areas.  Not only 
does a single patent tell a competitor what innovation has already been made, but also 
entire portfolios reveal the direction in which an innovating firm is going.  Lest they be 
ensnared as infringers, competitors know to direct their innovations elsewhere.  
Competitors continue prospecting for innovations across a range of ideas away from what 
                                                                                                                                                              
But even a quick scan of the Internet shows that this problem is not real.  The 
typical laptop computer represents a bundle of thousands of patent and other IP 
permissions, yet the negotiation to buy one takes only a few clicks of a mouse 
and costs as little as $1,000, if not less.  Indeed, recent empirical work by Ronald 
Mann has found that even in the controversial area of business method patents, 
there is not any serious “patent thicket” problem. 
Id. at 17. 
19
  Id. at 16 (“Patent rights are different, because a U.S. patent owner has incentives to 
engage in, not avoid, open transactions.”). 
20
  Kitch, supra note 2, at 273-74. 








Unlike the reward theory, prospect theory offers few moral overtones.  The theory 
focuses on the use of patents to minimize duplication of effort among competing 
innovating firms.  It highlights the coordination effect of the patent system among 
competing actors.  Social welfare benefits from each firm going in its own direction 
without duplicating efforts society has already paid another firm to make.  Each firm will 
seek to avoid the exclusive rights of its competitors, and devote its scarce resources to 
staking out its own.  It does not seem to matter who eventually holds the property right 
under the prospect theory.  Whether the right belongs to a garage inventor who does 
nothing with it, or a licensing entity who collects royalties without manufacturing 
anything, the patent has already served its function.  It has already spurred other 
innovating firms to avoid duplicating its subject matter. 
Prospect theory has another leg up on reward theory – a recognition that patent 
systems create dynamic outcomes.  Analyzing rent dissipation in a static market might 
have its uses.  But sometimes markets themselves come into existence as a result of 
innovating activities.  Imperfectly allocated social welfare is still more than zero social 
welfare – the condition that exists before any market-creating innovation.  Prospect 
theory is less concerned about access restrictions because of its assumption that 
competing firms will try to innovate around them.  However, as shown in the next 
section, prospect theory is incomplete to the extent it deals only with the conduct of 
competing actors.  Commercialization theory explains the interactions of complementary 
actors as well (e.g., players in a vertical marketplace). 
As with reward theory, a later section of this article will test prospect theory 
against the distinct types and subtypes of licensing and enforcement entities. 
C. Commercialization Theory 
Commercialization theory focuses neither on compensating for new ideas, nor on 
efficiency among competing firms in allocating resources.  Instead, it looks at the 
pragmatic effects of patent ownership and transfer.
22
  It posits that each patent serves as a 
beacon.  The beacon alerts the commercial world to the collection of technologies and 
rights embodied by the patent document.  And since a patent and its rights can be 
transferred, the system promotes bargaining.  These two features – beaconing and 
bargaining – allow patents to serve a coordination function.  The coordination function 
enables multiple complementary actors to communicate with each other and work 
together within a product market.  By enabling reasonable predictability of outcomes, 
patents thereby support investment in product markets.  All of these combined traits and 
effects incentivize investment, communication, and coordination in a marketplace.
23
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The important characteristic of patents here is that each one can be bartered.  Each 
patent is a unit of exclusive rights in the hands of whoever wants to use it that way.  
Ultimately those exclusive rights maximize social welfare in the hands of a firm that will 
exploit them in the consumer marketplace.  However, a patent might pass through several 
hands before it gets there.  In effect, patents themselves are units of currency in a patent 
marketplace.  They are assets and by statute have the attributes of personal property.
24
  
Some inventors would not have entered the field if patents were not transferable. 
As with reward theory and prospect theory, a later section of this article will test 
commercialization theory against the distinct types and subtypes of licensing and 
enforcement entities. 
III.  ECONOMIC LITERATURE IN TERMS OF REWARD, PROSPECT, AND COMMERCIALIZATION 
THEORY  
This section surveys the economic literature covering the patent system.  The 
survey is illustrative, not exhaustive.  The survey underscores how common it is for 
economists to conduct their analysis without regard to distinctions among the various 
types of rights holders. 
A. Reward Theory 
What can pure economic literature (as distinct from the law and economics 
variety) add to the understanding of each of these theories?  The backbone of all 
economic theory is a rational decision maker.  For patents, the rational choice would be 
to patent only when the benefits of the patent outweigh the costs of trying to obtain one.  
Reward theory is consistent with treating innovators as private calculators of cost-benefit 
outcomes.  Reward theory argues that patents incentivize innovation by increasing the 
benefits associated with obtaining a patent. 
Consistent with reward theory, some economists have tried to model the social 
welfare effects of patenting.  Deardorff concludes that the monopoly markets created by a 
patent provide less social welfare than would a competitive market in which the invention 
exists, but not the patent.
25
  The conclusion that patents hurt social welfare (because they 
create a monopoly market) is doubtful because of its unduly narrow ex post perspective.  
If one assumes that an invention will certainly be created with or without a patent, then 
yes, a monopoly market is less optimal than a competitive market.  But the invention may 
not have been made without the possibility of the patent protection.  For the inventor, 
would the invention‟s benefits have been greater than the costs if he could not obtain 
monopoly profits?  And would society be better off with the invention and a monopoly 
market than without the invention at all? 
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Take the following thought experiment: before Selden filed his patent for a gas-
powered automobile in 1879, the main form of transportation was horse and buggy.  
While an individual during the 19th century might benefit from the transportation 
opportunities brought by the horse and buggy, it had its limitations.  An economist might 
assign the horse and buggy a particular economic measurement of happiness, or “utility 
level.”  After the invention and patenting of the gas-powered automobile, a presumptive 
monopoly market arose.
26
  Any individual who chose to purchase one of these vehicles 
was required to pay the monopoly price, and theoretically some were unable or unwilling 
to purchase these vehicles because of this high price.
27
  The consumer utility levels of 
these less wealthy people remained the same, as they had to continue their use of the 
horse and buggy.  But those who could afford the new form of transportation experienced 
a higher level of utility.  As a result, social welfare (as defined by total utility levels 
across society) increased.  Thus, assuming the Selden innovation helped spur the 
American automotive industry, the patent benefited society.
28
 
An economist viewing this scenario from an ex post perspective might point out 
that social welfare had the potential to increase by a larger value if a competitive model 
had been practiced in which more consumers could purchase the automobile and have the 
higher associated utility level.  But would this invention have been created without the 
incentive of monopoly profits?  Assuming no, some increase in welfare is better than 
none at all.  Allowing the inventor and his successors to claim the monopoly market 
through a patent was the optimal economic choice for society.  By viewing the act of 
patenting ex ante, a patent and monopoly market appears more beneficial than no 
innovation at all. 
A concern remains, of course, that some inventions would come about without a 
patent system.  Patenting in those cases might diminish social welfare.  The legal regime 
is designed to cull these out with patent invalidity doctrines that deprive an inventor of a 
patenting right for inventions that only require ordinary skill.  In the United States, it is 
now settled that inventions that are “obvious to try” do not deserve patent protection.29  
The larger reward theory question then becomes, does the overall increase in social 
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  Or at least an oligopoly.  Until Henry Ford “broke” the exclusive rights reflected in the 
Selden patent, the Association of Licensed Automobile Manufacturers was able over a ten-year 
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key distinction that is often overlooked.  The authors appreciate there is a certain irony after our 
exhortation in the title. 
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  KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 419 (2007). 




welfare from invention “spurred” by the patent system outweigh the decrease in social 
welfare from patenting of inventions that would have been made anyway? 
Reward theory can provide useful tools for analyzing these spurring effects.  
Analyzing patent markets with a reward theorist perspective, Schmidt illustrates how 
incentives to innovate in the context of standards-essential patents differ in different 
business models.
30
  He concludes, counter-intuitively, that patent pools (and similarly 
horizontal integration
31
) maximize innovation incentives as compared to vertical 
integration
32
 and non-integration.  One reason this occurs is because a patent holder in a 
vertically integrated company has an incentive to increase the royalty it charges to 
outside competitors to gain a competitive advantage.  With this power it can raise the 
royalty rate so high that it is too costly to enter the standards-controlled industry, and thus 
deter any new competitor (who needs to license the patent to innovate) from entering the 
industry.  Alternately, horizontal integration tends to reduce royalty rates to innovators 
(an effect understood by Schmidt as reducing the cost of entry for new innovators).  
Schmidt posits that new innovators can purchase a license to a pool of essential patents at 
a cheaper rate than if each patent were licensed individually.  This allows them greater 
profit potential in the downstream product market, and increases the rate of participation, 
thus increasing the amount of innovation.  Is Schmidt focusing too much on the “access” 
side of the incentive-access continuum? 
But Schmidt‟s conclusions assume that all patents in the patent pool are perfect 
complements, and thus all essential to the standard that the pool represents.  In practice, 
this is not always the case.  In many instances these patent pools shield weaker patents 
from challenge of invalidity (either by explicit agreement or because pooling erodes 
incentives to challenge patents).
33
  The addition of weak patents in the pool has the same 
effect on innovation as a combination of substitute patents: to directly prevent 
competition that should have occurred.  Because of the additional protection of the pool, 
a weak patent is granted enforcement rights that it may not have secured standing alone.  
Instead of paying to license an unpooled patent, an infringer could claim invalidity in 
court and win.  After this, the innovation can be used without paying royalties since it is 
no longer covered by a patent.  Innovators who would have had to pay a licensing fee to 
use the technology covered by the weak patent when pooled no longer have to when 
unpooled.  Thus, the rate of innovation using this prior technology increases because the 
reward for innovation is higher.
34
  Schmidt is therefore not on firm ground when using 
reward theory principles to argue that pooling increases innovation. 
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Schmidt also claims that a patent pool is superior to vertical integration as a tool 
to mitigate patent thickets.  The patent thicket supposedly creates a complementary effect 
(i.e., hold-out power by each rights holder), which results in social inefficiency from 
excessive royalty rates for an outside-the-pool innovator trying to license a group of 
patents.
35
  But what happens when no pool of essential patents is present, and a new 
entrant licenses individual patents through several discrete market-rate negotiations?  By 
individually licensing these patents, a new entrant can avoid purchasing weak or 
substitute patents that could be found in a patent pool.  As a result, the initial investment 
for licensing is actually lower, despite the additional transaction costs of many discrete 
negotiations.  In such a case, vertical integration would be better for innovation and entry 
of new market players than horizontal integration or a patent pool.  Lower initial 
investments lead to greater rewards for innovation, and thus increase the rate of 
innovation and the quantity of competition.  
As shown, Schmidt assumed a black-and-white situation where a pool contains 
“essential” patents – patents that are unquestionably infringed by any new entrant.  What 
happens when those easy assumptions are gone?  Uncertainties in the patenting process 
weaken the conclusions of reward theory.  Rather than model incentives to innovate from 
an ex post perspective, the ex ante analyst must recognize these delays and uncertainties.  
As of early 2010, 750,000 patent applications were currently waiting to be approved.
36
  
The uncertainty associated with patent delay imposes significant costs on patent 
applicants and reduces their likelihood to innovate. 
Patent rewards undeniably spur some amount of innovation or market entry.  In 
his empirical research about how firms make use of the patent system, Mansfield 
obtained an estimate of the proportion of inventions developed in 1981-1983 that would 
not have been developed without the possibility of obtaining patent protection.
37
  His 
results concluded that 60% of inventions in the pharmaceutical industry would not have 
been developed without patent protection and 38% would not have been developed in the 
chemical industry.  In four other industries (petroleum, machinery, fabricated metal 
products, and electrical equipment) patents incentivized creation of over 10% of their 
products.  Thus, patents seem to be successful in their goal of providing innovation 
incentives to potential innovators.  In this way, empirical evidence supports the basic 
assumption of reward theory that incentives spur innovation and can supply an ex ante 
boost to social welfare.  
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Such statistics also have a negative implication under a reward theory framework.  
Are we sure that society benefits when – perhaps – 40% of pharmaceutical, 62% of 
chemical and 90% of other industries‟ innovations might have come about anyway 
without the reward of a patent?  If one believes the patent system serves no societal 
functions beyond spurring, such statistics can be alarming.  As will be shown, other 
theories hold there are indeed additional societal functions. 
B. Prospect Theory 
Prospect theorists advocate treating a patent as a property right, acting as a claim 
to an inventive territory. Patents publicize a property right and inform new entrants of 
areas of research that have already been claimed.  Thus, they can continue a forward 
progression of innovation rather than repeat prior research. 
In his analysis of optimal incentives for innovation, Wright suggests that “the 
range of situations in which a practical patent system dominates other feasible 
alternatives may be narrower than is commonly believed.”38  He determines that in many 
situations research contracts and prizes, rather than patents, might provide the socially 
optimal incentive for innovation.
39
  But a prospect theorist would differ with these 
conclusions, arguing that research contracts and prizes do not give the inventor the 
property rights that are granted by patents, nor do they cause the forward progression that 
arises from publication of competitor achievements.
40
  With a patent comes a territorial 
claim and an announcement that an innovation has already occurred.  Patenting also 
communicates a threshold level of seriousness and commitment to seeing the innovation 
come to market.  This alerts competing firms of successful research, so that they can then 
transfer investment to research that has not already been completed.  Reducing 
duplicative research allows investments to be put toward new endeavors and increases the 
rate of innovation.  Contracts and prizes cannot produce this result on such a massive 
scale.  Therefore, patents might be optimal in more situations than Wright concludes. 
The dissemination of information by a patent holder adds social value to the act of 
patenting.  But such communication would not occur unless the patentee was likely to 
maintain exclusivity over his invention.
41
  A patent grants this assurance in ways a prize 
or contract cannot.  Kitch outlines these additional benefits of patents in his seminal 
paper on prospect theory: 
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a)  A patent “increases the efficiency with which investment in innovation 
can be managed.”42  No one is likely to make significant investments in a 
patented technology without working with the patent holder.  Patent 
holders will be receptive to working with others because of the security 
provided by their property right. 
b)  The patent owner can make investments to maximize the value of the 
patent without fear that his work will be appropriated by competitors. 
c)  Without a patent, there is less incentive to advertise a product.  
Competitors could free ride on the demand for the product created by the 
first seller without incurring the same marketing expenses.  On the other 
hand, a patent holder will be able to capture all of the reward resulting 
from advertising himself and is thus more likely to extensively market the 
good to consumers and educate them about a product. 
d)  A patent reduces duplicative research: once a patent has been issued 




While Wright does not analyze the benefits of patents in comparison to trade 
secrecy, Kitch argues that the above reasons also favor a patent system over a system 
having only trade secrecy.
44
  Thus, a patent‟s unique ability to encourage the exchange of 
information is essential to the value of a patent system.  Patents encourage information 
exchange and a consequent increase in output that trade secrecy cannot.  Patent protection 
encourages the patentee to license and share the invention, while an invention kept as a 
trade secret cannot be shared or licensed without restriction for fear of imitation and loss 
of rights.  Because of the efforts required to keep a trade secret from losing its value, 
owners of trade secrets are reluctant to share their innovation as freely as patent holders.  
Therefore, patents do not invariably reduce outputs when compared to alternative means 
of protecting innovation.  Output-enhancing confidence of market actors might trump 
output-reducing effects of above-competitive pricing. 
  Rare within economic literature, Reinganum accounts for the uncertainty 
inventors face in predicting the feasibility and profitability of their innovation.
45
  Aware 
of the competitor-informing function of patents under the prospect theory, she accounts 
for uncertainty resulting from the possibility of a protracted development period, the 
possibility that a rival may innovate first, and the possibility that a rival firm may imitate 
the innovation and appropriate some of the profits in the new market.  As a result of this 
uncertainty, firms must determine the amounts they are willing to invest in research and 
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development, knowing that some of their investment might be wasted.  Her model 
concludes that firms will generate knowledge at a higher rate when patent protection is 
perfect than when it is imperfect.  The possibility for exclusive control of their invention 
can compensate for the uncertainty firms face in the inventing process.  Thus property 
rights in patents (granting an exclusive claim to the innovator) are essential to spurring 
innovation in the face of uncertainty.  It is not optimal for firms to wait for their rivals to 
innovate in the face of uncertainty.  Perhaps no rival will succeed in creating the 
invention.  If the firm wants any payoff, its optimal strategy is to pursue the payoff 
actively rather than wait for a rival to succeed and try to attain the rewards of imitation. 
C. Commercialization Theory 
Commercialization theory illustrates the value of patents as a form of currency 
that can be used to further goals unrelated to market creation or entry.
46
  Such goals can 
be to improve a firm‟s competitive position when trying to acquire start-up funds, to 
improve negotiating terms when licensing other patents, and to reduce the chance of 
paying excessive royalties to external patent owners.  In their study of patenting in the 
U.S. semiconductor industry from 1979 to 1995, Hall and Ziedonis found empirical 
evidence that large firms use patents as bargaining chips rather than as discrete rewards 
for innovation.
47
  During the time period they studied, the U.S. legal environment became 
friendlier to patent rights.  Rather than increasing the monetary incentive for patenting, 
these stronger rights motivated firms to participate in “patent portfolio races.”48  Patents 
were valuable for their use as bargaining chips when negotiating licensing or cross-
licensing agreements.  The strengthening of patent rights also increased the risk that a 
patentee could exclude or block another innovator from using the patented technology.  
Large patent portfolios could be used to avoid being excluded by external patent holders. 
Graham et. al. found similar results in the 2008 Berkeley Patent Survey.
49
  In their 
survey of 1,332 early-stage technology companies, they found that firms sought patents 
to prevent technology copying (a core patent function to be sure), but also to secure 
financing, and to enhance their reputation. Venture capital investors appeared much less 
willing to invest in companies that held no patents.  The patent acted as a signal of quality 
in an uncertain investment environment, and dispelled some of the information 
asymmetries between the investor and the start-up.  Thus, the patent served as a beacon to 
venture capital investors and increased a start-up‟s likelihood of receiving funds.  Patents 
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also increased the odds and quality of a liquidity event (such as an acquisition or IPO), 
and served as a crucial bargaining chip in negotiating and defending against patent 
infringement suits. 
IV.  TESTING PATENT ECONOMIC THEORIES AGAINST REALITY  
The survey above suggests that the literature on patent economics often does not 
take into account the important distinctions among types of rights holders.  The literature 
largely assumes that a patent will inevitably supply its owner with exclusive rights.  
When infringed, the patent will invariably be enforced, and infringement will invariably 
be abated.  When invalid or not infringed, the owner will reap no rewards.  Much of the 
literature also makes the dubious assumption that a product market exists for each patent.  
Product market monopoly power, in turn, sets the stage for arguments about rent 
dissipation and diminution in social welfare. 
Few commentators seem to appreciate the following considerations about patent 
enforcement (or at least have not found a way to incorporate them into theory): 
 




 For those that are brought, transaction costs and size asymmetries distort the 
settlement value; 
 Court outcomes are unpredictable – cases that should have been won are lost, 
and cases that should have been lost are won; 
 De minimis infringement makes enforcement irrational by any measure; 
 Courts treat patents under liability rules, rather than property rules, leading to 
compulsory licensing situations instead of injunctions;
51
 and 
 Licensing discussions happen in the shadow of all of the above, and are 
susceptible to gamesmanship when actors adjust their negotiating position to 
take advantage of factors other than extent of use, validity, or value of an 
innovation. 
 
Each player braces for these costs, uncertainties, and other non-merits factors of licensing 
and litigation in a different way.  Recognition of these differences leads to a more 
nuanced view of patent system theories. 
The following sections focus on considerations, apparently overlooked by the 
existing literature, that each type of rights holder gives to licensing and enforcement.  
These considerations, in turn, impact how true to reality the various patent system 
economic theories are. 
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A. “One Big Idea” Inventors 
Tens of thousands of individuals file for and obtain patents each year.  Of these, 
many inventors have only one patent.  This is their “One Big Idea.”  It might represent 
the culmination of a life‟s work, or it might be a quickly-conceived improvement in a 
commonplace field. 
Individuals seeking representation either seek prospectively to license their rights, 
or they have already located a possible infringer and seek enforcement advice.  Patent 
enforcement is a perilous gauntlet for individuals to run.  The obstacles individuals face 
in getting third-party companies to incorporate their ideas while paying for them are 
legendary. 
When there is already infringement, individuals can almost never afford full-scale 
representation by patent law firms, with high hourly billing rates.  If traditional 
representation models were the only option, most individuals would have to suffer all 
infringement without recourse.  In economic terms, this category of rights holder would 
effectively have to supply royalty-free compulsory licenses to all comers.  Mitigating 
this, contingency fee representation is sometimes an option.  In the contingency fee 
model, lawyers forego their hourly fee in exchange for a percentage of the recovery (by 
settlement or judgment).  Ordinarily, lawyers seek contingency cases that will be more 
profitable than what would otherwise be billed on an hourly basis.  The chance for a high 
fee compensates for the risk of no fees at all, and the corresponding opportunity costs.  




Under this structure, individuals are at a clear disadvantage to infringers.  
Enforcing their patents costs too much.  Their challenge is not just to get the infringer to 
stop or pay something.  Their challenge is to get any help at all, and then try to get the 
infringer to stop or pay.  They will find representation only for the most valuable cases, 
where the merits look very good and a potential damages award will be large enough to 
entice a contingency fee lawyer. 
How does this all relate to the reward theory framework?  Recall that reward 
theory urges balance between the extremes of the incentive–access continuum.  There 
should be incentives for bringing inventions into existence, yet caution about rent 
dissipation arising from monopoly power.  In the vast majority of cases, the “One Big 
Idea” inventors neither experience the rewards and incentives of the patent system, nor 
prevent meaningful third party access.  In situations of small- or medium-scale 
infringement, the system is biased against them.  They are relatively powerless actors 
whose situation forces them to endure infringement without recourse.  This is ironic.  The 
morality tale the reward theory advances ostensibly supports individual inventors.
53
 
Meanwhile, individual inventors still have some beneficial effect under the 
prospect theory.  While prospect theory describes the way patents allow competitors to 
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allocate resources amongst themselves, nothing prevents the same competitors from 
monitoring the creative output of individuals in their fields.  One might expect the same 
spurring effect when a competing patentee is a mere individual.  Firms will still observe 
the area already staked out by the individual‟s patent, and move on to invent elsewhere. 
The commercialization theory might be the most descriptive of the three for “One 
Big Idea” inventors.  With the emergence of patent auction marketplaces, and 
proliferation of NPEs (discussed below), individuals no longer have to be alone in the 
search for representation or resources.  The beacon effect and the bargaining effect are 
agnostic about the power of the rights holder.  These effects posit that parties will come 
together for a negotiation, but assert no ex ante bias in how the negotiation should 
proceed or who between the rights holder and its negotiating counterparts should assert 
the greatest negotiation power.
54
  In the end, the marketability of the patent right to 
complementary players becomes the mechanism for bringing incentives and rewards to 
the individual.  Commercialization theory thus overlaps with reward theory.  This arises 
because patent rights of an individual are equally able to coordinate behaviors among 
complementary actors, as are patent rights of any large entity.  That is, a patent rights 
marketplace allows transfer of rights to larger entities.  Once the rights are owned by an 
entity who does not suffer the same power asymmetries that the individual does, the 
rights are just as good as those of any other patent. 
B. “Thomas Edisons” 
What distinguishes “Thomas Edisons” from “One Big Idea” inventors is 
sophistication about patents.  A serial inventor is more likely to know the ins and outs of 
the patent system, and is likely better able to locate representation for licensing or 
enforcement.  When and if negotiations with a third party get started, serial inventors 
might have more to offer – a greater skill at drafting valuable patent claims, multiple 
portfolios, continuation applications in which claims can still be amended to cover 
existing infringements, etc. 
That said, serial inventors face the same difficulties as other individuals.  The 
reward theory, prospect theory, and commercialization theory considerations discussed 
above for the case of “One Big Idea” inventors would also apply to “Thomas Edisons.”  
While serial inventors might end up with more negotiating power than one-off inventors, 
the difference is of degree, not kind.  They still face massive asymmetries that deter 
enforcement. 
C. NPEs 
NPEs are the most diverse group of licensing and enforcement entities.  They 
include companies who just license or enforce patents, as well as universities and 
government agencies.  Newer breeds include portfolio aggregators, as well as defensive 
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aggregators who acquire patents to protect “subscribers” against infringement charges.  
As with individuals, the reward theory does not characterize NPE behavior particularly 
well.  NPEs other than universities and government agencies do not typically carry out 
research and development themselves (with Intellectual Ventures being a prominent 
exception).  Instead, they tend to purchase patent rights from other owners – for instance, 
individuals or corporations.  As such, NPEs rely on a secondary market in patent 
properties.  NPEs do not need incentives or rewards to innovate.  Instead, they depend on 
prior incentive and reward systems having prodded their transaction partners to innovate. 
Proponents of reward theory usually show only antipathy toward NPEs (hence the 
popularity of the “patent troll” ad hominem).  Since they do not typically invent, and they 
are not in any product markets, any success they achieve in licensing or enforcement 
appears to outsiders as a windfall to the “wrong” party.  This happens even though many 
NPEs structure their purchase transactions to guarantee future revenue to the original 
innovator.  However, NPEs do not unduly restrict access.  Their usual motives are to 
monetize intellectual property, not restrict output or raise prices above the competitive 
level in a product market.  Even where their success in patent enforcement might lead a 
licensee to raise prices, the pre-license price might have been sub-competitive, since it 
did not incorporate the true costs of inputs before the license fee was paid.  In short, 
neither the incentive nor the access side of the reward theory continuum seems to 
describe NPEs aptly. 
Likewise, prospect theory would find it hard to account for NPEs.  As rights 
acquirers, rather than rights generators, NPEs do not themselves advance any prospecting 
function of the patent system.  None of their actions communicate efficient areas of 
research to any competitors. 
NPEs find their greatest justification in the commercialization theory (and vice 
versa).  NPEs negate some of the power asymmetries felt by individual inventors.  NPEs 
allow individual inventor patents to be evaluated on their own merits within a license 
negotiation or enforcement campaign.  NPEs also introduce liquidity into technology 
markets.  In other words, when acquiring rights to an individual‟s or a company‟s patent 
or portfolio, the NPE acts as a technology broker and facilitates a robust technology 
marketplace. 
NPEs also make funding available to start-up companies and their backers.  
Venture capital will nearly always obtain security interests in intellectual property of the 
backed company.  Years later, if a financing company must attach the collateral and sell 
it, an NPE might end up being the very purchaser who lets the financing entity get its 
return on investment.  While purchases of patent rights out of bankruptcy have attracted 
scorn, they undeniably help keep financing markets healthy.  By enhancing liquidity in 
technology markets, NPEs create the very conditions that enable venture capital to 
support start-up companies.  In turn, this enhances competition by nurturing new entrants 
in preexisting product markets. 
In short, a patent‟s marketability is the foundation of its use to secure business 
financing, and commercialization theory would look favorably on NPEs.  The investment 
community needs clear rules for both transferability and enforceability.  NPEs and 
commercialization theorists each share a common interest in such clear rules. 




Under commercialization theory, diminution of exclusive rights undermines the 
value of a patent.
55
  By extension, it reduces the utility of patents for raising investment 
capital.  Reducing the power of patents to exclude infringers directly impacts the small 
business community in two ways.  First, it reduces the capacity for the patent to act as a 
beacon to attract capital (such as in NPE-backed financial markets).  And second, if 
infringement does occur and the firm needs to enforce its rights, it reduces the firm‟s 
chances of keeping or obtaining its market share. 
While reward theory stigmatizes NPEs, and prospect theory is disinterested in 
them, commercialization theory describes them.  In one sense, all start-up firms are NPEs 
until they get a toehold in a consumer marketplace.  Thus the theory best explains firm 
behavior in precisely an NPE context.  In addition, for patents to serve their strongest role 
in protecting investment-backed expectations, they must be maximally marketable.  Thus, 
a patent as a unit of currency ought to be equally enforceable in the hands of all owners.  
This is true even for middlemen and licensing entities.  Thus, decisions like eBay v. 
MercExchange
56
 (which held district courts have discretion to decide whether adjudged 
infringers should be enjoined, and hence is seen as diminishing property rights in patents) 
will have unintended consequences going forward.  Reducing the availability of 
injunctions, and varying their applicability depending on who the rights owner happens to 
be, hurts the marketability of patent rights.
57
  In turn, hurting patent marketability impairs 
start-up financing, which in turn raises barriers to entry.  Commercialization theory 
would say that rule changes that hurt NPEs strengthen the market power of larger 
entrenched firms. 
D. “Not Invented Heres” 
Sometimes an operating company acquires patents from others in order to 
incorporate the innovations into a new product.  Every once in a while, a garage inventor 
achieves that elusive goal of selling the invention to a big company.  This category also 
includes larger firms who merge with smaller firms and acquire their intellectual 
property.  And finally, companies sued for infringement sometimes resolve the litigation 
by acquiring the patent, then enforce the patent against their own competitors.  
The “Not Invented Heres,” when acquiring, licensing, or enforcing their rights, 
share some features of NPEs, and some features of operating companies who develop in-
house (“R&D Practitioners”).  They are like NPEs in that they facilitate a liquid 
marketplace in innovation.  Indeed, they can be the ultimate destination of marketed 
patent rights.  In that sense, they embody and justify commercialization theory, as 
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discussed above in connection with NPEs.  On the other hand, they are like R&D 
Practitioners in that they participate in a product market that uses the patent rights.  In 
that sense, they embody and justify reward theory, since they fit the narrative of an entity 
who participates in a product market with patent-protected products. 
But the situation of the “Not Invented Heres” demonstrates that no single type of 
patent owner can embody every patent system theory.  Of the three theories discussed in 
this article, the “Not Invented Here‟s” do not particularly fit into the prospect theory 
paradigm, for all the reasons stated above for NPEs.  They acquire rights that others had 
already made, and thus those rights already served the prospecting function (e.g., 
coordination among competitors in the relevant product space). 
E. “R&D Practitioners” 
“R&D Practitioners” are the paradigmatic rights holder upon which the pure 
economics literature builds its theories.  Members of this category research and develop 
new products, and acquire patent protection for them as part of the overall product 
commercialization effort.  When the literature expresses calculations and theories that 
investigate patenting effects in related product marketplaces, it is almost necessarily 
referring to “R&D Practitioners.”  Intellectual myopia apparently leads economists to 
ignore other types of actors. 
Yet even such paradigmatic patentees do not completely fit into any of the 
conventional patent system economic theories.  Reward theory holds that patents 
incentivize firms to create new products.  Research and development companies ought to 
embody the “incentive” pole of the incentive–access continuum.  Yet the data discussed 
above, section III.C., suggests, at best, a loose connection between patent availability and 
the decision to enter or create a product market.  Likewise, the widespread use of patents 
as defensive negotiating chips (indeed, this is the exclusive use of patents at some 
companies) does not fit conventional notions of the far-sighted inventor reaping his just 
rewards.  In the rare cases
58
 when titans do clash (e.g., the recent battle between Apple 
and Nokia where each side threw a massive portfolio against the other), the tale to be told 
is distinctly amoral.  Unless unique facts emerge, neither side in such a fight claims a 
sympathetic moral narrative.  No one is a long-suffering garage inventor, and no one is a 
troll. 
Even prospect theory – the one theory that self-consciously analyzes competitor 
interactions enabled by patents – falls short under scrutiny.  For example, some operating 
companies certainly monitor filings and issuances in the Patent Office by their 
competitors.  But not all do.  And of those who do, it is far more likely to be the legal 
department who monitors competitor patents, not the relevant engineering manager.  As 
well, monitoring is more likely for purposes of minimizing infringement risk for products 
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  The threat of a countersuit deters operating companies from suing infringers who are also 
portfolio owners.  “Peace treaties” (e.g., mutual term licenses) are common, leading to the ironic 
fact that the very entities most financially capable of stopping a third party from using its patent 
rights are also the least likely to try. 




already in the pipeline than for creating strategic maps of where future pipelines should 
be laid.  
Lastly, commercialization theory might well describe patenting benefits for early-
stage operating companies.  They need venture capital the most, and will use patent rights 
to secure financing.  But entrenched companies have no particular need to set up a beacon 
showing that they are patenting ideas, because they have no particular need to bargain for 
any technology transfer to sustain operations.  In these ways, “R&D Practitioners” fail to 
justify any particular patent system economic theory. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Before now, debate over the role of the patent system, and its usefulness to 
society, has been incomplete.  Patent system economic theories have all but ignored the 
large diversity of actors in the patent acquisition, licensing, and enforcement community, 
to say nothing of their idiosyncratic traits.  For example, this article highlights the little-
recognized contribution to social welfare of NPEs under well-grounded aspects of 
commercialization theory.  This article also questions the assumptions of zero risk and 
unambiguous property right treatment of patents assumed by most authors in a survey of 
pure economics literature.  Meanwhile, people form prejudices and make policy based on 
modes of thinking that have no demonstrable connection to the real world.  This article 
seeks recognition of the nuances and inconsistencies that emerge when testing patent 
economic systems against real world actors and their motives. 
 
 
